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We examine the eﬀects of third-party clearinghouses that license in-
tellectual property on behalf of inventors when downstream uses of IP
require licenses to multiple complementary innovations. We consider
diﬀerent simple clearinghouse royalty redistribution schemes, and dif-
ferent innovation environments. We show that clearinghouses generally
increase incentives to invest in R&D as they increase eﬃciency in li-
censing. However, they may reduce expected proﬁts of inventors who
have the unique ability to develop a crucial component. We also show
that clearinghouses also may increase or decrease expected welfare, and
are more likely to be beneﬁcial when R&D costs are relatively high,
and/or the probability of success for inventors is relatively low.
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11 Introduction
Many new innovations or products depend on multiple complementary up-
stream components. When diﬀerent components are developed by indepen-
dent inventors, licensing for downstream uses that combine these compo-
nents may suﬀer from various ineﬃciencies dubbed the “tragedy of the anti-
commons” (Heller & Eisenberg 1998, Buchanan & Yoon 2000). Speciﬁcally,
negotiating with multiple licensors may entail high transaction costs, and
independent uncoordinated licensors may set royalties that are excessively
high in total.
For example, development of a new genetic diagnostic medical test may
require licensing multiple patented inventions, owned by diﬀerent inventors,
related to gene sequences, gene expression technologies, and so on (Van
Overwalle et al 2006, OECD 2002). In such a case, high costs may be borne
by end-users of the test, resulting in low levels of usage of the test, or the
costs associated with licensing could be so high that development of the test
becomes uneconomic entirely. As well as genetics, similar situations can also
arise in information technology and communications industries, for example
(Shapiro 2001, Aoki & Nagaoka 2005).
In response to these licensing ineﬃciencies, a number of institutions and
arrangements have emerged or been promoted, including patent pools, cross-
licensing, collective rights organisations, and clearinghouses (Shapiro 2001,
van Zimmeren et al 2006, Aoki & Schiﬀ 2008). In this paper we focus
on third-party clearinghouses and examine the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of
simple clearinghouse mechanisms on ex post licensing and ex ante incentives
to invest in R&D. Speciﬁcally, we model third-party clearinghouses that
license complementary innovations jointly on behalf of member intellectual
property owners.
We use a simple innovation framework where a downstream innovation
or product requires the development of two complementary upstream com-
ponents. A number of upstream research ﬁrms can invest in developing
these components, and each has some probability of success. When mul-
tiple ﬁrms invest, there is some chance that multiple versions of either or
both components will be developed independently. All successful innova-
tors earn revenues by licensing their innovations to downstream users. After
investment and the outcome of the random investment process is realised,
each successful inventor can choose to license independently, or join a clear-
2inghouse and license his innovation jointly with the other members. The
clearinghouse sets royalties to maximise the joint proﬁts of its members.
In our model, introducing a clearinghouse generates a number of tradeoﬀs
in terms of proﬁts of research ﬁrms and welfare, which we explore. Ex post,
after the outcome of investment is known, a clearinghouse increases welfare
and proﬁts if both components have a single inventor, as it overcomes the
coordination problem that leads to the tragedy of the anticommons. How-
ever, if either or both components have multiple substitute inventions, the
clearinghouse may increase proﬁts but reduce welfare as it allows success-
ful inventors to eﬀectively collude and undermine the competition among
themselves. Ex ante, before ﬁrms invest, expected proﬁts of the research
ﬁrms and expected welfare depend on the level of investment, which deter-
mines the probabilities of the diﬀerent licensing market conﬁgurations ex
post. In turn, the level of investment in R&D is aﬀected by the presence of
a clearinghouse.
We use this model to evaluate two diﬀerent royalty distribution schemes
for a clearinghouse: equal distribution of royalties among members, and un-
equal distribution that gives a disproportionately larger fraction of royalties
to a member who is the sole inventor of one component when the other com-
ponent is competitive. We show that the unequal scheme improves welfare in
all ex post licensing situations relative to the equal scheme, as it can guaran-
tee the participation of all successful inventors. However, either scheme may
be inferior to no clearinghouse if both components have multiple inventors
with substitute inventions. We also consider two diﬀerent innovation models
within which we compare the ex ante performance of the two types of clear-
inghouse. In the ﬁrst model, both components are symmetric and a large
number of competitive research ﬁrms have the ability to develop each. In
the second model, one component is unique and a single ﬁrm has the ability
to develop it while the other component has many possible inventors.
We ﬁnd that clearinghouses always increase ex ante incentives to in-
vest in R&D by increasing ex post proﬁts from licensing, except when one
component can only be developed by one ﬁrm and the clearinghouse redis-
tributes royalties equally. In this case the unique ﬁrm may not wish to join
the clearinghouse, but competitive inventors of the other component will,
which makes the former ﬁrm worse oﬀ. Clearinghouses may also increase or
decrease ex ante expected welfare. A clearinghouse that distributes royal-
3ties unequally can always generate higher expected welfare for a given level
of investment than no clearinghouse, as it can ensure participation of all
successful innovators and solve the “anticommons” ineﬃciencies. However,
a clearinghouse that distributes royalties equally does not always perform
better than no clearinghouse, as it cannot achieve full participation of in-
novators. In particular, an equal clearinghouse only performs better than
no clearinghouse when the level of investment in R&D is relatively low, so
that the probability that one or both components has multiple successful
inventors is not too high.
However, these welfare comparisons do not take account of the change
in investment level induced by the clearinghouse. Once these are taken
into account, even an unequal clearinghouse can reduce ex ante expected
welfare if it results in an increase in investment beyond the socially desirable
level. We use a numerical simulation to compare the equilibrium expected
welfare of the diﬀerent clearinghouse types under the diﬀerent investment
models. In general, a clearinghouse that redistributes royalties unequally
performs better than one that distributes royalties equally, except for some
subset of parameter values. In addition, the unequal clearinghouse performs
better than no clearinghouse when costs of innovation are high, and/or the
probability of an inventor’s success is low, as these are the cases where
improving licensing eﬃciency is most beneﬁcial.
The organisation of the rest of this paper is as follows. In the next
section we present a simple model of ex post licensing with a clearinghouse.
Then in section 3, we embed this ex post model in the two diﬀerent random
investment models, and compare diﬀerent types of clearinghouse in terms of
ex ante expected proﬁts and welfare. In section 4 we perform further welfare
comparisons using numerical simulations. Section 5 concludes.
2 Eﬀects of clearinghouses on ex post licensing
There are two components or research tools, A and B, that are needed for
the production of a downstream innovation or product. Upstream research
ﬁrms invest in R&D to develop these components and earn royalties by
licensing their innovations to downstream users. The two components are
perfect complements and an inventor of either component cannot earn any
royalties unless the other component has also been invented. There are a
4large number of research ﬁrms, each of which has the capacity to undertake
a single research ‘project’ at some cost. The research ﬁrms are separated
into two types: those that can develop A, and those that can develop B. Any
individual project may result in the invention of one of the components or
it may be unsuccessful and invent nothing. We allow for the possibility that
equivalent versions of either component may be independently invented by
multiple inventors.
A third-party clearinghouse may also exist and can license innovations
on behalf of member inventors. All successful inventors have the option
to join the clearinghouse or license independently. The clearinghouse seeks
to maximise the total royalty revenues of its members from licensing, and
distributes these revenues among its members according to a distribution
rule that it announces in advance.
Given this setup, innovation and licensing takes place in two stages:
Stage 1: Each research ﬁrm decides whether or not to invest in an R&D
project and those that invest invent a component according to their type,
with some probability.
Stage 2: Successful inventors simultaneously decide whether or not
to join a clearinghouse or license independently, and then innovations are
licensed by the clearinghouse and/or any independent inventors and royalties
are paid by licensees.
In this section we describe our model of stage two of this process and
ﬁnd the ex post equilibrium payoﬀs of successful inventors and equilibrium
welfare, for a given outcome of the ﬁrst stage. The next section examines
two alternative models of the ﬁrst stage.
We look for a subgame perfect equilibrium. Provided that both com-
ponents have been invented, successful inventors can earn royalties from
licensing. The royalties that are generated depend on the number of inde-
pendent licensors for each component. Let πM denote the total monopoly
royalties obtained by licensing all successful inventions of both components
jointly and let πD denote the duopoly royalties each component receives
when there is one independent licensor for each component. Similarly, let
WM denote the total downstream welfare that arises when both components
are licensed jointly, WD denote the welfare level when the two components
are licensed independently, and W0 > WM denote the welfare level when
both components are licensed for zero royalties. Since components A and B
5are complements, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 The ‘tragedy of the anticommons’ reduces joint proﬁts and
welfare when the two components are licensed by two independent licensors
compared to when they are licensed jointly: πM ≥ 2πD and WM ≥ WD.
The potential payoﬀs of successful inventors depend in part on the re-
distribution policy of the clearinghouse. We consider two diﬀerent policies:
Deﬁnition 1 An equal clearinghouse distributes its royalty revenues equally
among its members. If the clearinghouse earns π and has n members, each
member receives π/n.
Deﬁnition 2 An unequal clearinghouse distributes disproportionate royalty
revenues to a member (if any) who is the sole successful inventor of a compo-
nent when the other component is competitive. If the clearinghouse earns π
and one component has a single inventor and the other component has n ≥ 2
inventors, the monopoly inventor receives zπ and all other inventors receive





. In all other situations, the clearinghouse
distributes revenues equally among its members.
Payoﬀs of successful inventors also depend on how many inventors there
are of each component. There are three cases where downstream production
is possible:
Case 1: Both components have a single successful inventor;
Case 2: One component has a single inventor and the other component
has two or more independent inventors; and
Case 3: Both components have two or more independent inventors.
In cases 2 and 3, inventors of a competitive component cannot earn
any royalties unless they all join a clearinghouse, since competition between
them will drive royalties down to zero. We thus assume that such inventors
always join either type of clearinghouse, if it exists. On the other hand, in
cases 1 and 2 a monopoly inventor of a component may or may not want to
join a clearinghouse. In case 1, if both inventors license independently they
each receive πD, while if both join either type of clearinghouse they receive
πM/2. If one inventor joins the clearinghouse but the other does not, the
situation is eﬀectively the same as where both do not join, and both receive
πD. Therefore, by Assumption 1, both successful inventors have a weakly
dominant strategy to join either type of clearinghouse in case 1.
6Clearinghouse π1 πM
2 πC
2 (n) π3 (nA,nB)
None πD πM 0 0
Equal πM/2 πD πD/n πM/(nA + nB)
Unequal πM/2 zπM (1 − z)πM/n πM/(nA + nB)
Table 1: Equilibrium payoﬀs of successful inventors under diﬀerent types of
clearinghouse and diﬀerent outcomes of the innovation process.
If case 2 arises, the successful inventors of the competitive component will
all join either type of clearinghouse, as explained above. If the competitive
component has n inventors, the inventor of the monopoly component will
join an equal clearinghouse if πM/(n + 1) ≥ πD and will join an unequal
clearinghouse if zπM ≥ πD. To distinguish equal and unequal clearing-
houses, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2 A monopoly inventor of a component does not join an equal
clearinghouse when there are n ≥ 2 inventors of the other component, but
does join an unequal clearinghouse. That is, πM ≤ 3πD and z ≥ πD/πM.1
We can now summarise the equilibrium payoﬀs of successful inventors
in stage 2, depending on which of the three cases above has arisen from
the innovation process. Let π1 be the royalties that a successful inventor
receives in case 1, let πM
2 be the royalties that the monopoly inventor re-
ceives in case 2, let πC
2 (n) be the royalties that a successful inventor of the
competitive component receives in case 2 when there are n ≥ 2 inventors
of that component, and let π3 (nA,nB) be the royalties that a successful
inventor receives in case 3 when there are nA ≥ 2 successful inventors of A
and nB ≥ 2 successful inventors of B.
Table 1 shows the values of these payoﬀs for diﬀerent types of clear-
inghouse, as determined by the equilibrium of stage 2 of the model. In
comparison with no clearinghouse, an equal clearinghouse increases an in-
ventor’s royalties if there are multiple inventors of the same component, or if
there is only one inventor of both components. However, the clearinghouse
decreases royalties from πM to πD when the inventor is the sole inventor of
1Such a value of z achieves the clearinghouse’s objective of maximising the total roy-
alties of its members, since it ensures that all inventors join and consequently the clear-
inghouse royalties are πM.
7a component but the other component is competitive. In this situation, the
existence of the clearinghouse reduces competition among inventors of the
competitive component, which beneﬁts them but harms the sole inventor of
the other component.
An unequal clearinghouse increases a successful inventor’s royalties com-
pared to no clearinghouse unless the inventor is the sole inventor of one
component while the other component is competitive. In this case the value
of z is suﬃcient to induce the monopoly inventor to join the clearinghouse,
but she is still worse oﬀ compared to when no clearinghouse exists, because
the clearinghouse gives some fraction of πM to the competitive inventors of
the other component. An unequal clearinghouse may also make successful
inventors better or worse oﬀ compared to an equal clearinghouse. If, for
example, A has a single inventor but B is competitive, the inventors of B
receive πD/nB under an equal clearinghouse, but (1 − z)πM/nB under an
unequal clearinghouse. Since z ≥ πD/πM to attract the inventor of A to
join the unequal clearinghouse, this reduces the payoﬀs of the inventors of
B relative to the equal clearinghouse.
Similarly, let W1, W2 and W3 be the equilibrium welfare levels attained
from licensing in cases 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Table 2 shows the welfare
levels (ignoring R&D costs) that result under each type of clearinghouse in
each of the three cases. Compared to no clearinghouse, an equal clearing-
house improves welfare when both components have a single inventor (case
1), but reduces welfare in all other cases, as the clearinghouse allows multiple
inventors of the same component to reduce competition among themselves.
An unequal clearinghouse with an appropriate value of z always attracts all
inventors to join, and thus always achieves the welfare level WM. Compared
to no clearinghouse, this increases welfare when both components have a
single inventor (case 1), but reduces welfare when both components have
multiple inventors (case 3), and leaves welfare unchanged in case 2. In every
case an unequal clearinghouse generates at least as much welfare as an equal
clearinghouse, and outperforms it when one component has a single inventor
and the other has multiple inventors (case 2).
8Clearinghouse W1 W2 W3
None WD WM W0
Equal WM WD WM
Unequal WM WM WM
Table 2: Equilibrium welfare (ignoring investment costs) from licensing un-
der diﬀerent types of clearinghouse and diﬀerent outcomes of the innovation
process.
3 Eﬀects of clearinghouses on ex ante expected
proﬁts and welfare
In this section we examine and compare clearinghouses under two alternative
models of the investment and innovation process in stage 1 of the game.
3.1 Investment model 1: All projects are equal
In this model, every research project costs c and has the same chance of
developing a component or developing nothing. Research ﬁrms and projects
are exogenously specialised towards the development of A or B and a large
number of ﬁrms are capable of undertaking projects of each type. Let NA
and NB be the total number of projects undertaken to develop A and B
respectively. The success of any project is independent of that of any other
project. Given that Ni ≥ 1 projects are undertaken for component i = A,B,
the probability that ni ≤ Ni successfully develop the component is denoted
by P (ni,Ni), where
￿Ni
ni=0 P (ni,Ni) = 1 and limNi→∞ P (ni,Ni) = 0 for
all ni ∈ {0,1,...,Ni}.
Since the components are identical, we consider symmetric situations
where NA = NB = N, thus 2N projects are undertaken in total. The
expected proﬁt of a research ﬁrm given that N research projects are under-
taken for each component is denoted π(N). The probability that there is
one successful inventor of each component (case 1) and a given research ﬁrm
is one of these is 1
NP (1,N)
2. The probability that a research ﬁrm is the sole
inventor of their component while the other component has n ≥ 2 inventors
(case 2, monopoly) is 1
NP (1,N)P (n,N). The probability that a research
ﬁrm is one of n ≥ 2 inventors of their component while the other component
has a single inventor (case 2, competitive) is n
NP (n,N)P (1,N). The proba-
9bility that a research ﬁrm is one of m ≥ 2 inventors of their component while
the other component has n ≥ 2 inventors (case 3) is m
NP (m,N)P (n,N).
Considering all possibilities under which cases 1, 2 and 3 can occur, using
the payoﬀ deﬁnitions from Table 1, the expected proﬁt of a research ﬁrm is
π(N) = 1
NP (1,N)
















NP (m,N)P (n,N)π3 (m,n) − c. (1)
Let πNC (N), πEC (N) and πUC (N) be a research ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt
under no clearinghouse, an equal clearinghouse and an unequal clearinghouse
respectively given that N projects are undertaken for each component. Re-
call from Table 1 that the existence of a clearinghouse potentially involves
both ex post gains and losses for research ﬁrms. The following proposition
shows that, in terms of ex ante expected proﬁts, the gains always outweigh
the losses, for any given N.
Proposition 1 Given N, the expected proﬁt of a research ﬁrm is highest
with an unequal clearinghouse and lowest with no clearinghouse, that is,
πUC (N) ≥ πEC (N) ≥ πNC (N) for all N ≥ 1.
Proof. Substituting payoﬀs from Table 1 into (1), πUC (N) ≥ πEC (N)
if P (1,N)
￿N
n=2 P (n,N)[πM − 2πD] ≥ 0, which is true by Assumption










m+nP (m,N)P (n,N)πM ≥ 0, which is also true by Assump-
tion 1. Finally, πEC (N) ≥ πNC (N) if f (N)πM ≥ g(N)2πD where
g(N) = P (1,N)












Since πM ≥ 2πD and f (N) ≥ g(N), we have πEC (N) ≥ πNC (N) if f (N) ≥












10with R(n,N) = P (n,N)/P (1,N), and this last inequality can be rewritten
as
￿￿N
n=2 R(n,N) − 1
￿2
≥ 0, which is true.2
Since research ﬁrms are competitive, the equilibrium number of projects,
N∗, satisﬁes π(N∗) ≥ 0 and π (N∗ + 1) < 0. In this model, either type of
clearinghouse always increases the ex ante proﬁts of a research ﬁrm, and
thus generates greater investment in R&D compared to no clearinghouse,
for a given level of per-project costs.
Using the welfare deﬁnitions from Table 2, expected total welfare given
that N research projects are undertaken for each component is
W (N) = P (1,N)









P (m,N)P (n,N)W3 − 2Nc (2)
Let WNC (N), WEC (N) and WUC (N) be the total expected welfare with
no clearinghouse, an equal clearinghouse and an unequal clearinghouse re-
spectively. The following proposition compares the expected welfare gains
and losses from introducing a clearinghouse.
Proposition 2 Given N, expected welfare with an unequal clearinghouse is
always higher than that with an equal clearinghouse: WUC (N) ≥ WEC (N)
for all N ≥ 1. In addition, expected welfare with no clearinghouse is high-
est when N is suﬃciently large but lowest when N is small: WUC (N) ≥
WEC (N) ≥ WNC (N) for suﬃciently small N, and WNC (N) ≥ WUC (N) ≥
WEC (N) for suﬃciently large N.
Proof. From Table 2 it is clear that WUC (N) ≥ WEC (N) since WM ≥ WD.
From Table 2 and (2), WUC (N) ≥ WNC (N) if
P (1,N)





P (m,N)P (n,N)[W0 − WM].
Since
￿N
n=2 P (n,N) = 1 − P (0,N) − P (1,N), this can be rewritten as
￿



























11The right-hand side of this inequality is positive since W0 ≥ WM ≥ WD.
If N = 1 the left-hand side equals zero since P (0,1) + P (1,1) = 1, so
WUC (1) > WNC (1). At higher values of N, the left-hand side eventually
becomes arbitrarily large, since limN→∞ P (n,N) = 0 for all n, thus for
suﬃciently large N this inequality does not hold and WUC (N) < WNC (N).


















which can be rewritten as
P (1,N)[2P (0,N) + 3P (1,N) − 2]





The right-hand side is positive while the left-hand side is arbitrarily large
at N = 1 and converges to zero as N increases. Thus WEC (1) > WNC (1),
and WEC (N) ≤ WNC (N) for suﬃciently large N.
Intuitively, an unequal clearinghouse always generates more welfare than
an equal clearinghouse because, given that both components are invented,
it guarantees that the welfare level with a single licensor, WM, is achieved,
while the equal clearinghouse only achieves WD ≤ WM in the case when one
component has a single inventor while the other component has multiple
inventors. However, no clearinghouse outperforms both types of clearing-
house when N is large. This is because when N is large, the most likely
outcome is that both components have multiple inventors (case 3). In this
case, with no clearinghouse, competition among inventors drives royalties
for both components to zero, and the highest possible welfare level, W0, is
achieved from licensing. Similarly, no clearinghouse generates low welfare
levels relative to both types of clearinghouse when N is low, because then
it is more likely that both components have a single licensor and thus joint
licensing through a clearinghouse achieves WM instead of WD.
Propositions 1 and 2 also imply that there is a potential tradeoﬀ in terms
of the equilibrium eﬀects of a clearinghouse on expected welfare. For any
given level of investment in R&D (given N), introducing some sort of clear-
inghouse may or may not raise expected welfare. However, even if welfare
increases given N, it is not guaranteed to increase once the increase in invest-
ment is taken into account, since R&D is costly. Without making additional
assumptions it is impossible to solve the zero-proﬁt condition on (1) to de-
termine the equilibrium R&D investment and perform comparative statics
12analysis between the diﬀerent clearinghouse regimes. We therefore use a
numerical simulation model in section 4 to examine this tradeoﬀ further.
There may also be a conﬂict between the incentives of existing intel-
lectual property owners and research ﬁrms who have not yet invested, in
terms of their willingness to use and support a clearinghouse. For example,
Table 1 shows that if case 2 arises, the monopoly inventor is made worse
oﬀ by the existence of either type of clearinghouse relative to when there
is no clearinghouse. Sole successful inventors of an essential component for
a downstream innovation may thus be reluctant to use a clearinghouse if it
means that they have to share some royalties with competitive inventors of
another component. On the other hand, Proposition 1 showed that the ex
ante expected proﬁt of a research ﬁrm is always increased by the creation of
a clearinghouse. Thus innovators who have not yet invested are more likely
to support the creation of the clearinghouse, even if, ex post, there is some
chance that they will have a monopoly over their component.
3.2 Investment model 2: Component A is unique
In this version of the model, a single research ﬁrm (‘ﬁrm A’) has the unique
ability to develop component A. We assume its success is deterministic,
and it can develop A for certain if it invests cA. As before, there are also
competitive research ﬁrms that each can undertake one research project to
try to develop B at a cost of cB. Given that N projects are undertaken
by these component B ﬁrms, the probability that n of them are successful
is P (n,N). We let πA (N) denote ﬁrm A’s expected proﬁt given that it
invests and given that N projects invest in B, and let πB (N) denote the
expected proﬁt of an individual project aimed at developing B given that
ﬁrm A invests.
Of licensing cases 1, 2 and 3 considered earlier, only 1 and 2 are possible
in this model. Given that ﬁrm A invests, the probability that there is a single
inventor of both components (case 1) is P (1,N) and the probability that A
has a single inventor while B has multiple inventors (case 2) is P (n,N) for
n ≥ 2. Thus we have




2 − cA. (3)
13Proposition 3 Given N, Firm A is always better oﬀ under an unequal
clearinghouse compared to an equal clearinghouse when Assumption 2 holds.
In addition, ﬁrm A’s expected proﬁt is highest with no clearinghouse for
relatively high values of N, but is highest with an unequal clearinghouse for
relatively low values of N. That is, πNC
A (N) ≥ πUC
A (N) ≥ πEC
A (N) for
suﬃciently high N and πUC
A (N) ≥ πEC
A (N) ≥ πNC
A (N) for suﬃciently low
N.
Proof. From Table 1 and (3), πUC
A (N) ≥ πEC
A (N) if
[1 − P (0,N) − P (1,N)](zπM − πD) ≥ 0
which is true for all N under Assumption 2. Similarly πUC









The right-hand side of this expression is positive by assumption. The left-
hand side is arbitrarily large when N = 1, so πUC
A (1) ≥ πNC
A (1). As N
increases, the left-hand side converges to zero, since limN→∞ P (n,N) =
0 for all n, thus for suﬃciently large N, πUC
A (N) < πNC
A (N). Finally,
πEC
A (N) ≥ πNC
A (N) if
P (1,N)






Again the right-hand side is positive and this expression holds at N = 1,
but the left-hand side converges to zero as N increases.
Firm A always prefers an unequal clearinghouse to an equal one provided
that the unequal clearinghouse sets z high enough so that it induces ﬁrm
A to join ex post. In comparison to no clearinghouse, ﬁrm A prefers a
clearinghouse only when N is small and the probability that component
B has a single inventor is relatively large. In that case, ﬁrm A beneﬁts
from the existence of a clearinghouse because joint licensing with a single
inventor of B increases A’s proﬁts. However, if B has multiple inventors,
competition among them drives the royalty for B to zero, and ﬁrm A is
able to appropriate all of the monopoly proﬁts from licensing when there is
no clearinghouse. If an equal clearinghouse exists, in such a situation the
inventors of B will license jointly, which hurts ﬁrm A, while if an unequal
clearinghouse exists, ﬁrm A also joins, but has to share some royalties with
14the inventors of B. In either case, ﬁrm A is worse oﬀ compared to when no
clearinghouse exits.










2 (n) − cB. (4)
Proposition 4 For any given N, a research ﬁrm that invests in compo-
nent B is always better oﬀ under either an equal or unequal clearinghouse
compared to no clearinghouse. Such a ﬁrm is better oﬀ under an unequal
clearinghouse compared to an equal clearinghouse if z ≤ 1 − πD/πM.
Proof. From Table 1 and (4), it is straightforward to verify that the
assumption that πM ≥ 2πD guarantees that πEC
B (N) ≥ πNC
B (N) and
πUC
B (N) ≥ πNC
B (N) for all N ≥ 1. We also have πUC





[1 − P (0,N) − P (1,N)][(1 − z)πM − πD] ≥ 0
which is true provided that z ≤ 1 − πD/πM.
Having either type of clearinghouse never makes a component B research
ﬁrm worse oﬀ because the ﬁrm always gets a strictly higher ex post payoﬀ
whatever the outcome of the random innovation process compared to when
there is no clearinghouse in this model, as shown in Table 1. Whether an
unequal clearinghouse is better than an equal clearinghouse for these ﬁrms
depends on the fraction of revenues that the unequal clearinghouse gives
to ﬁrm A. Both types of clearinghouse give the same payoﬀ, πM/2, to a
component B inventor when there is a single successful inventor of that
component. When there are multiple successful inventors of B, an equal
clearinghouse does not induce ﬁrm A to join, so an inventor of B gets πD/n.
With an unequal clearinghouse, ﬁrm A joins and the clearinghouse revenues
rise to πM, but a fraction z is given to ﬁrm A to induce it to join. Thus
component B inventors are only better oﬀ relative to an equal clearinghouse
if z is not too large. Note that there is always some range of z that both
induces ﬁrm A to join an unequal clearinghouse and makes component B
inventors better oﬀ compared to an equal clearinghouse. This requires z ∈
[πD/πM,1 − πD/πM], which is always feasible since πD/πM ≤ 1
2.
Combining Propositions 3 and 4, the existence of a clearinghouse in-
creases the incentive of component B ﬁrms to invest in R&D, but may
15increase or decrease ﬁrm A’s incentive to invest. In addition, if the in-
troduction of a clearinghouse increases investment by component B ﬁrms,
this in turn may increase or decrease ﬁrm A’s ex ante proﬁt. Overall, intro-
ducing a clearinghouse will increase investment in component B, but has an
ambiguous eﬀect on ﬁrm A’s incentive to invest.
As in the ﬁrst investment model, there may also be a conﬂict between
existing and potential innovators. For example, if ﬁrm A has already in-
vested, it will be opposed to a clearinghouse if there are multiple inventors
of component B. This model also generates a conﬂict between ﬁrm A and
component B ﬁrms. Under an unequal clearinghouse, if ﬁrm A has already
invested it will want z to be as high as possible. However, having no clear-
inghouse or a high value of z reduces the expected proﬁts of a component
B research ﬁrm. On the other hand, if investment has not yet taken place,
ex ante ﬁrm A may be willing to sacriﬁce some of its ex post proﬁts, by
supporting a clearinghouse or a lower value of z, to give greater incentive to
the component B ﬁrms to invest, since A cannot earn any revenues unless B
is also invented. We examine these tradeoﬀs further numerically in the next
section.
The expected welfare given that ﬁrm A invests and N ≥ 1 other ﬁrms
invest is
W (N) = P (1,N)W1 +
N ￿
n=2
P (n,N)W2 − cA − NcB. (5)
Proposition 5 Given N, expected welfare is always highest with an unequal
clearinghouse, under Assumption 2. An equal clearinghouse generates higher
welfare compared to no clearinghouse only for suﬃciently low N. That is,
WUC (N) ≥ WEC (N) ≥ WNC (N) for suﬃciently low N, and WUC (N) ≥
WNC (N) ≥ WEC (N) for high N.
Proof. From Table 2 and (5), it is straightforward to show that WM ≥ WD
implies WUC (N) ≥ WEC (N) and WUC (N) ≥ WNC (N) for all N ≥ 1.
Similarly, WEC (N) ≥ WNC (N) if
[2P (1,N) + P (0,N) − 1][WM − WD] ≥ 0.
This is true at N = 1 since P (1,1)+P (0,1) = 1 and WM ≥ WD. However
the ﬁrst bracket converges to −1 as N becomes large, thus WEC (N) <
WNC (N) for suﬃciently large N.
16In this model the unequal clearinghouse always does best in terms of
expected welfare. This is because with a unique inventor for component
A, a situation in which there are multiple inventors of both components
never arises, and the welfare level W0 is never achieved. Thus since the
unequal clearinghouse guarantees the welfare level WM, provided that z
is high enough that ﬁrm A joins, it always performs better than either
no clearinghouse or an equal clearinghouse. On the other hand, an equal
clearinghouse only outperforms no clearinghouse if N is low so that the
chance that component B has a single inventor is relatively high. When N
is large, it is relatively likely that competition among inventors of B will
drive the royalty for that component to zero, resulting in welfare level WM
with no clearinghouse. However, an equal clearinghouse permits multiple
inventors of B to reduce competition, resulting in welfare of WD.
Finally, as in model 1, the ranking of expected welfare in Proposition 5
takes the level of investment in R&D as given. While an unequal clearing-
house always results in the highest expected welfare level given N, once the
change in investment induced by the clearinghouse is taken into account, a
clearinghouse may either increase or decrease ex ante expected welfare.
3.3 Summary
The above analysis shows that clearinghouses have some diﬀerent eﬀects in
the two diﬀerent investment models. Here we summarise the results we have
obtained so far and compare clearinghouses versus no clearinghouse in terms
of ex ante and ex post proﬁts and welfare.
Ex ante proﬁt: In model 1, introducing a clearinghouse increases ex
ante proﬁt for all N, while in model 2 ex ante proﬁt always increases for
component B ﬁrms, but only increases for ﬁrm A when N is relatively low.
Ex post proﬁt: In both models, introducing a clearinghouse increases the
ex post proﬁt of inventors of a component that has multiple inventors. It also
increases inventors’ proﬁts when both components have a single inventor.
Thus, ex post, component B inventors are always better oﬀ from introducing
a clearinghouse in model 2. However, a clearinghouse reduces the ex post
proﬁt of the sole inventor of one component when the other component is
competitive. Thus any research ﬁrm has a chance of being made worse oﬀ in
model 1, and ﬁrm A may be made worse oﬀ in model 2 if B is competitive.
Ex ante welfare: In model 1, either an equal or unequal clearinghouse
17increases welfare relative to no clearinghouse when N is low, but decreases
welfare when N is high. In model 2, the same is true for an equal clearing-
house, but an unequal clearinghouse always increases ex ante welfare relative
to no clearinghouse, provided that ﬁrm A invests.
Ex post welfare: Either type of clearinghouse increases ex post welfare
in both models when both components have a single inventor. When one
component has a single inventor and the other component has multiple in-
ventors, under both models an equal clearinghouse decreases ex post welfare
while an unequal clearinghouse leaves welfare unchanged. If both compo-
nents have multiple inventors, which only arises in model 1, both types of
clearinghouse reduce ex post welfare.
4 Simulation analysis
In this section we use numerical simulations of our two investment models to
investigate further the tradeoﬀs between welfare and incentives to invest that
were identiﬁed above. For the simulation we assume that total demand for
licenses from both components is linear and is given by Q = 100−ρ where Q
is the number of licenses sold and ρ is the total per-unit royalty for licensing
both A and B. Under this assumption, the royalty revenues of a licensor
setting a royalty of ri is Ri = (100 − ρ)ri where ρ =
￿
ri, and total welfare
generated by licensing is W = 50(1 − ρ)(1 + ρ). When there is a single
licensor, ρ is chosen to maximise (100 − ρ)ρ, which gives ρM = 1
2. Under
duopoly, it is straightforward to show that the noncooperative equilibrium
royalties are ρD = 2
3. These give the parameter values shown in Table 3.
It is clear that these values satisfy Assumption 1. To satisfy Assumption 2,





We also assume that the random investment processes are binomial, with
the probability of success of any given project given by σ, thus




The exogenous parameters of the simulation model are therefore the success
probability σ, the unequal clearinghouse parameter z, and the investment
costs c (in model 1) and cA and cB (in model 2). Simulations were pro-
grammed in R 2.6.0 for Windows, and source codes are available from the
authors on request.








Table 3: Model parameters for linear demand for licensing, where Q =
100 − ρ with ρ the total per-unit royalty.
4.1 Model 1 simulations
The key question from model 1 is how introducing either type of clearing-
house aﬀects equilibrium investment in the two components and hence the
expected equilibrium welfare level. We examined this by using a simulation
that iterates over a grid of values of c and σ. For each pair of parameters
the equilibrium investment level is found by evaluating (1) and using a nu-
merical search algorithm to ﬁnd the highest level of N at which π(N) ≥ 0
and π(N + 1) < 0. With binomial success probabilities, π (N) eventually
approaches −c as N becomes large, since the probability that any individual
project is successful tends to zero. Thus provided that π (N) > 0 for some
relatively low values of N, an equilibrium with investment in both compo-
nents exists. Otherwise, we recorded the equilibrium as N = 0, representing
no investment.
For each combination of c and σ, this procedure was repeated assuming
no clearinghouse, an equal clearinghouse and an unequal clearinghouse, and
the equilibrium level of investment was recorded in each case.3 Under each
type of clearinghouse, the welfare level at the equilibrium investment level
was calculated by evaluating (2). Thus for each combination of c and σ, we
record six values: the equilibrium investment level and the equilibrium wel-
fare level under no clearinghouse and each of the two types of clearinghouse.
We allowed c to vary between 0.1 and 10 in increments of 0.01 and σ to vary
between 0.05 and 0.95 in increments of 0.001, thus we conducted a total of
892,891 simulations for model 1.
Figure 1 illustrates a single example simulation of model 1, for the pa-
rameter values shown in Table 3, and assuming c = 2.5 and σ = 0.7. The
left panel shows the expected proﬁt of an individual research ﬁrm under
each type of clearinghouse, as a function of the number of projects that are
undertaken for each component. As in Proposition 1, introducing a clear-
3Note that in model 1 with an unequal clearinghouse, it is straightforward to show that






























































Figure 1: Illustration of a single simulation of model 1, for c = 2.5 and
σ = 0.7. The left plot shows expected proﬁts of a research ﬁrm given
that N projects are undertaken for each component, under each type of
clearinghouse. The right plot shows expected welfare as a function of N.
The large dots are the equilibrium welfare levels.
inghouse increases expected proﬁt for all N. In this particular case, there
is very little diﬀerence in terms of proﬁt between an equal and an unequal
clearinghouse. Under no clearinghouse, the equilibrium investment level is
N = 2, while under an equal or unequal clearinghouse it is N = 4. The
right panel plots expected welfare as a function of N under each type of
clearinghouse, and the large dots show the equilibrium welfare levels.
In this case, the increase in investment from N = 2 to N = 4 would
increase expected equilibrium welfare if the clearinghouse had no eﬀect on
ex post royalties. As Figure 1 shows, equilibrium welfare on the no clearing-
house curve is higher at N = 4 compared to N = 2 because the probabilities
that both components are successfully developed and both components have
competitive inventors are higher, and these gains outweigh the costs of the
additional research projects. However, once changes in ex post licensing are
taken into account, introducing a clearinghouse reduces equilibrium welfare
for these parameter values.
Repeating this process for all combinations of c and σ within the given
range allows us evaluate each type of clearinghouse in terms of the equi-
librium welfare level as a function of the parameters. Figure 2 shows the
results of this analysis by graphing the regions where equilibrium welfare is
highest with no clearinghouse, an equal clearinghouse, or an unequal clear-
20Figure 2: Parameter regions in which equilibrium expected welfare in model
1 is highest under each type of clearinghouse.
inghouse for diﬀerent combinations of c and σ. In general, no clearinghouse
performs best when the cost per project is relatively low, or the probability
of success of an individual project is relatively high. When the per-project
cost increases, everything else equal, investment falls under all clearinghouse
types. At suﬃciently high cost levels, having a clearinghouse may increase
welfare, as it increases the probability that both components are successfully
invented and the product can be produced. When the probability of success
increases, everything else equal, it becomes more likely that both compo-
nents will have competitive inventors for a given investment level, and in
this case the ex post welfare is highest with no clearinghouse. If both the
project cost and probability of success are relatively high, the welfare level
under an equal and unequal clearinghouse is the same, and this dominates
no clearinghouse. In these cases, costs are so high that no investment oc-
curs with no clearinghouse, while exactly one project is conducted for each
component under both types of clearinghouse, in which case the equal and
unequal clearinghouses produce the same welfare level.
Figure 3 further illustrates the complex structure observed at the bound-



























































Figure 3: Equilibrium investment and welfare in model 1 as a function of the
per-project cost c, assuming σ = 0.57, for no clearinghouse and an unequal
clearinghouse.
expected welfare as functions of c, holding σ ﬁxed at 0.57, under no clear-
inghouse and an unequal clearinghouse. Provided that c is not too high,
investment occurs under both no clearinghouse and an unequal clearing-
house, and the existence of a clearinghouse generally raises the investment
level for given c. The higher level of investment plus the fact that the clear-
inghouse results in higher royalties in many cases generally serves to reduce
expected welfare. However, if investment did not occur with no clearing-
house but does occur with a clearinghouse, then welfare is higher with the
clearinghouse. In addition, in some cases (for c between around 3 to 3.5),
investment levels both with and without a clearinghouse are not very high
(around 2 or 3 projects). In this case, it is relatively unlikely that either com-
ponent will have multiple inventors, and thus the expected welfare beneﬁts
of having a clearinghouse outweigh any expected losses.
4.2 Model 2 simulations
Simulations of model 2 were conducted in a similar manner as for model
1. In model 2, for there to be some probability of production, ﬁrm A must
invest and at least one component B ﬁrm must invest. Using (3) and (4)
we search for the largest value of N where πA (N) ≥ 0, πB (N) ≥ 0 and
πB (N + 1) < 0. As in model 1, the expected proﬁt of a component B ﬁrm
converges to −cB as N becomes large, thus an equilibrium where there is
22investment occurs if πB (N) ≥ 0 and πA (N) ≥ 0 for some relatively small
N. As well as the linear demand royalties and welfare from Table 3, the
other parameters in model 2 are cA, cB, σ and z. In general we normalise
cA and allow cB to vary. Unlike in model 1, in model 2 the asymmetry
between the component A and B research ﬁrms means that z has an eﬀect
on the expected proﬁts of both ﬁrm A and the component B research ﬁrms.
Figure 4 illustrates a single simulation of model 2, for some particular
parameter values. With no clearinghouse the equilibrium is N = 3, with
an equal clearinghouse it is N = 8 and with an unequal clearinghouse it is
N = 5. In this case, z > 1−πD/πM, so following proposition 4, the expected
proﬁts (and hence investment level) of component B ﬁrms is highest under
an equal clearinghouse, followed by an unequal clearinghouse and then no
clearinghouse. In all of these three cases, the expected proﬁt of ﬁrm A
is positive, so it invests. For these parameter values, expected equilibrium
welfare is highest with an unequal clearinghouse. As in proposition 5, for any
given N, an unequal clearinghouse generates the highest expected welfare
level in model 2. For the parameter values shown in Figure 4, the welfare
beneﬁts of having an unequal clearinghouse compared to no clearinghouse
plus the increased probability that component B is successfully developed
more than oﬀset the costs of the additional investment in component B
that is induced. However, an equal clearinghouse would reduce expected
welfare compared to no clearinghouse as it stimulates too much investment
in component B.
As noted above, the value of z under an unequal clearinghouse is not
neutral in this model. Given any N ≥ 2, a higher value of z increases the
expected proﬁt of ﬁrm A and reduces the expected proﬁt of a component
B research ﬁrm under an unequal clearinghouse. Thus higher z will reduce
investment in component B, but make it more likely that ﬁrm A will ﬁnd in-
vesting proﬁtable, everything else equal. Figure 5 illustrates this tradeoﬀ by
showing ﬁrm A’s expected proﬁt and expected equilibrium welfare as func-
tions of z, for some speciﬁc values of cA, cB and σ. To generate this ﬁgure,
for each value of z in the feasible range, the equilibrium investment levels
under an unequal clearinghouse were calculated in the manner described
above, and the corresponding expected proﬁts of ﬁrm A and expected wel-
fare were calculated. The discrete steps observed in the results correspond























































































Figure 4: Illustration of a single simulation of model 2, for cA = 8, cB = 1.3,
σ = 0.5 and z = 0.75. The left plot shows expected proﬁts of ﬁrm A
given that N projects are undertaken for component B, under each type of
clearinghouse. The middle plot shows the expected proﬁt of a component
B research ﬁrm. The right plot shows expected welfare as a function of N
and the large dots are the equilibrium welfare levels.
When the probability of success for component B ﬁrms (σ) is low, Figure
5 shows that expected proﬁts and welfare generally decline as z increases.
With low σ, equilibrium investment in component B is low, while equilibrium
welfare is increasing in N provided that cB is not too large, since additional
investment would raise the probability that component B is invented. In this
case, increasing z reduces investment in component B and reduces expected
welfare. Reduced investment in component B also negatively aﬀects ﬁrm A
in this case as it can only earn proﬁts if component B is also invented. Thus
when σ is low, ex ante ﬁrm A prefers a low value of z as this stimulates
investment in component B, even though it may reduce ﬁrm A’s ex post
licensing proﬁts.
At higher values of σ, Figure 5 shows that equilibrium expected proﬁts
of ﬁrm A and welfare may be increasing and then decreasing in z. Again
increasing z reduces investment in component B under an unequal clearing-
house. However, this may increase welfare if σ is suﬃciently high, since the
cost savings from reduced investment can outweigh the reduced probability
that component B is invented. Indeed, if σ is very high then expected wel-
























































































































Figure 5: Firm A’s expected equilibrium proﬁt and expected equilibrium
welfare under an unequal clearinghouse as a function of z, for cA = 5 and
cB = 3.
case, investment in B is minimal since investors only get a return if they are
the sole successful investor, but this does not have a large adverse eﬀect on
ﬁrm A’s expected proﬁts or expected welfare.
Figure 6 shows parameter combinations of cB and σ where each type
of clearinghouse performs best in terms of ex ante expected welfare, for
diﬀerent values of z, holding cA constant. Again we simulated the model for
all combinations of cB between 0.1 and 10 (in increments of 0.01) and values
of σ between 0.05 and 0.95 (in increments of 0.001), for three diﬀerent values
in the feasible range of z. In total, 2,678,673 simulations of model 2 were
Figure 6: Parameter regions in which equilibrium expected welfare in model
2 is highest under each type of clearinghouse, for cA = 5.
25performed. In each case, the equilibrium under each type of clearinghouse
was recorded and the corresponding equilibrium expected welfare level was
calculated. As in model 1, given z, clearinghouses generally perform best
when the cost of R&D is relatively high or the probability of success is
relatively low.
In addition, comparing the results in Figure 6 for diﬀerent values of z
shows that as z increases, the range of parameters where no clearinghouse
performs best shrinks and the range where an unequal clearinghouse per-
forms best expands. This is because as z increases, the ex post payoﬀs to
ﬁrms under an unequal clearinghouse and no clearinghouse become similar,
except in the case where both components have a single inventor, as can
be seen from Table 1. Thus the level of investment achieved by an unequal
clearinghouse is similar to that with no clearinghouse when z is large, but
the clearinghouse increases welfare as it results in more eﬃcient licensing
when both components have a single inventor. Nevertheless, this does not
necessarily mean that z = 1 or z close to 1 is the socially optimal value of z.
For some parameter values, increasing z does make an unequal clearinghouse
perform better than no clearinghouse, but as shown in Figure 5 once eﬀects
on the level of investment are taken into account, the welfare-maximising
value of z can be anywhere within the feasible range.
Figure 6 also shows that as z increases the range of parameters where an
equal clearinghouse outperforms an unequal clearinghouse increases. The
ex post welfare under an equal clearinghouse may be less than that of an
unequal clearinghouse, as the equal clearinghouse does not result in the
participation of ﬁrm A when component B has multiple inventors. However,
the equal clearinghouse gives stronger incentives to component B ﬁrms to
invest compared to an unequal clearinghouse with a high value of z, which
may be preferable from a welfare point of view.
5 Conclusion
Our analysis has shown that clearinghouses can have both positive and neg-
ative eﬀects on ex ante and ex post proﬁts and welfare from licensing in-
novations. Taking a long-run perspective, the ex ante eﬀects on expected
proﬁts and welfare are arguably the most important. In this case we showed
that clearinghouses generally increase expected proﬁts from licensing. An
26exception is when there is a unique potential inventor for one component
(our model 2), in which case a clearinghouse may reduce that inventor’s
expected proﬁts when investment in the other component is relatively high.
Aside from this exception, clearinghouses generally increase incentives to
invest in R&D. However, as we showed, this increase in investment does
not always increase ex ante expected welfare, if the beneﬁts in terms of the
increased probability that all necessary components are developed does not
outweigh the additional cost of the R&D investment and any anticompetitive
eﬀects of the clearinghouse.
The possibility that a clearinghouse reduces welfare is particularly acute
in the case where royalties are distributed equally among members. If a
clearinghouse does not have the ability to diﬀerentiate royalty payments to
inventors whose innovations have no substitutes versus payments to those
who do have competitive substitutes, the clearinghouse increases expected
proﬁts from R&D but is likely to reduce expected welfare. Therefore, we
reach the policy conclusion that clearinghouses should be given ﬂexibility in
their royalty distribution scheme. Our analysis also showed that the optimal
level of asymmetry of royalty payments by a clearinghouse to inventions with
no substitutes versus those with substitutes varies depending on parameters
such as the costs of R&D and the probability of success. If a clearinghouse
spans multiple industries, for example, it may therefore be appropriate for
it to use diﬀerent royalty distribution arrangements in diﬀerent cases, de-
pending on industry characteristics.
Finally, our analysis highlighted some potential conﬂicts among diﬀerent
types of inventors in terms of their support for a clearinghouse. Clearing-
houses are most likely to be supported by successful inventors of competitive
innovations. However, their support should be viewed with some scepticism,
as it is essentially a collusive device for them. On the other hand, symmet-
ric inventors who have not yet invested and who all have an equal chance
of being successful are also likely to support a clearinghouse, but this may
enhance both proﬁts and welfare if it does not induce excessive investment.
Opposition to a clearinghouse is likely to come from successful inventors of a
component that does not have any substitutes, or inventors who have not yet
invested but have the unique ability to develop a component. In either case,
an unequal royalty distribution scheme is necessary to earn their support.
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